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**IAC-D-6/19
25 April 1958**

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

General Indicator List

Attached is a copy of the "General Indicator List" (approved by the IAC on 11 February 1958) in the form in which it was reproduced by the National Indications Center and recently made available to the IAC Secretariat for distribution to the IAC agencies.

Secretary

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Attachment

NSA, OSD reviews completed

MORI/CDF Pages 2-34

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NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER

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Room BC 956

Pentagon

24 February 1958

GENERAL INDICATOR LIST

(Approved by the IAC 11 February 1958)

INTRODUCTION

This is a list of major actions and developments which it is believed may occur prior to Soviet initiation of hostilities against the West, and particularly against the United States. These actions, or some combination of them, we believe may occur in the course of a progressive commitment of the resources of the Soviet state in executing a Soviet decision to initiate hostilities or to prepare for hostilities which Soviet leaders believed to be inevitable or threatening. Such a decision, which could be taken quite deliberately or very suddenly, could result from a host of varying circumstances - ranging from (a) an international crisis in which the USSR believed a US attack to be imminent or in which vital Soviet national objectives were being frustrated to (b) the achievement of a military-scientific development whose exploitation would result in overwhelming military superiority. These varying circumstances have been considered in compiling this list.

The various actions or indicators have been grouped into three broad — and overlapping — time phases according to successive phases in Soviet preparations for hostilities and in the relative possible imminence of hostilities. Within each time phase, further breakdown has been made between those actions taken, or whose effect would be, within the USSR or the Bloc, and those actions taken, or whose effect would be, outside the USSR and the Bloc. The internal actions have been further separated into those taken by the military forces and those principally affecting other aspects of national activity.

This arrangement into time phase/imminence groupings from Short Range to Long Range results in a parallel progression in the range of interpretations which can be placed on each of the various indicators. For instance, the Short Range indicators are those considered most likely to follow a decision for hostilities. On the other hand, indicators in the Medium and Long Range categories are open to a much wider range of interpretations, depending on the circumstances of their actual appearance.

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In this generalized listing it has not been possible to include the many specific actions, and the many reflections and repercussions of them, which would appear in connection with complete Soviet preparations for total war. Supplemental listings, covering the various specialized functional activities of the Soviet military forces, government and economy, will outline indicators of this degree of detail with considerably more precision and will include the many fragmentary indications of the existence of these steps toward war.

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I. SHORT RANGE

INTRODUCTION:

Actions which might accompany or immediately precede a Soviet attack or which might follow or accompany the alerting and/or positioning of forces for specific attack operations or for an estimated possible US attack. Such actions, or some progressive combination of them, might arise under the following circumstances (not necessarily complementary):

Sudden Soviet decision to attack;

As last-minute steps in the final readying of the military forces and the nation for pre-planned general hostilities (involving either an attack from present positions or one preceded by secret deployments);

In reaction to sudden Western moves interpreted by the Soviets as indicating imminent attack by the West;

Pre-planned deployment of forces to final "jump-off" positions for specific assaults involved in deliberate hostilities;

Positioning of forces against what appeared to be an increasing likelihood of hostilities in the near future;

General readying of forces for early combat operations from present positions, either for deliberate hostilities or against the likelihood of hostilities;

As preparations for deliberate hostilities, the minimum by which such actions might precede an attack would vary from a few minutes to several weeks. Those actions which comprise final or "last-minute" preparations for deliberate hostilities might precede an attack by less than 24 hours, since they would involve a degree of commitment seriously risking preventive Western assaults. Preparations for deliberate hostilities would probably entail a maximum of secrecy, while Soviet fear of an increasing likelihood of hostilities might be reflected by a maximum of urgency and minimal secrecy.

Many actions in this category are believed to represent a serious and expensive degree of commitment of national strength which could not be maintained over a long period under normal conditions.

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(Short)

I. SHORT-TERM

INTERNAL

A. Security and Deception:

1. "Blackout" or abnormally heavy censorship on information and public communications;
2. Suspension of normal aids to maritime and aerial navigation; lighting "brownouts" or "blackouts";
3. Imposition of increasingly stringent travel restrictions:
 - a. Ban on normal travel, particularly by diplomatic and other foreign personnel, especially outgoing travel;
 - b. New travel restrictions in military zones;
 - c. Unusual restrictions on the movement of the civil populace within, to or from areas of important military installations, particularly LRA bases, or probable surface-to-surface missile sites.
4. Imposition of increasingly stringent military and local security measures:
 - a. Additional guards and patrols at headquarters and other military installations;
 - b. Increased border patrolling (ground, sea and air);
 - c. New communications security measures; encipherment of weather broadcasts or cutbacks in information on unenciphered weather broadcasts;
 - d. Changed vehicle, aircraft, vessel or field post numbers.

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5. Initiation of major deception efforts covering the operation of major striking forces (e.g., to cover unusual operations or deployments of such forces by creating an appearance of normal operations, with particular reference to Long Range Aviation and long range submarine units);
6. Increased camouflage activity, particularly in forward areas or other areas of likely military assembly or buildup.

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B. Civil Defense:

7. Large-scale metropolitan alerts of the populace, involving movement to shelters or evacuation (including ostensible mass exercises), or selective evacuation of key elements of the populace;
8. Full-scale alerts of civil defense organizations;
9. Movement of civil defense crews, fire-fighting crews, disaster equipment, etc., to dispersed emergency stations;
10. Relocation, complete or selective, of major components of the government to dispersal sites;
11. Relocation and dispersal of metropolitan medical and surgical facilities;
12. Establishment and stocking of numerous first aid posts in metropolitan areas and environs;
13. Issuance of civil defense gear and survival gear to the populace — or to selected elements;
14. Greatly intensified activity by, and issuance of weapons to, paramilitary groups.

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C. Military Planning, Organization, and Mobilization:

15. Activation of new major military headquarters, raising of echelon of existing commands (especially in forward areas), or redesignation of administrative military headquarters as operational commands;
16. Greatly increased activity at headquarters (or alternate headquarters) of Defense Ministries and major commands;
17. Issuance of mobilization orders to individual reservists or to general categories of reservists, particularly in the western military districts of the USSR;
18. Induction of reservists and their assignment to units, raising of units to T/O & E strength, and/or mobilization of reserve units;
19. Cancellation of leaves; or marked deviations from normal military leave practices and/or abnormal movements of individual military personnel;
20. Extensive planning and briefing conferences at all levels of command in major striking forces (probably down to ground force battalion and air regiment level);
21. Large-scale issuance of tactical maps and other intelligence to ground combat units in forward areas;
22. Imposition of full-scale (wartime) alerts in military units;

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D. Military Movements and Operations:

23. Initiation of intensive, around-the-clock, active defensive measures (patrolling, augmented strip-alerts, full operational AAA and air defense alerts), particularly in the aerial or maritime approaches to key military installations (LRA bases and staging fields, naval bases, missile sites, etc.) and metropolitan centers;
24. Intensive around-the-clock maintenance of aircraft, naval vessels, and military vehicles, and fueling and checking of missiles;
25. Unusual disruption of training activity, such as abrupt cessation of usual maneuvers or exercises, by major striking forces (especially by Long Range Aviation and long-range submarine units and crews, particularly those with long experience); recall of units from training to home stations; or apparent preparations for abnormally large and realistic maneuvers which could serve as cover for launching of offensive operations;
26. Widespread hasty construction of field fortifications, bunkers, slit trenches, etc., in the forward areas and at internal military installations;
27. Sudden dispersal of naval vessels from major harbors or bases; dispersal of trucks, tanks, etc., from major depots or motor pools;
28. Urgent activity at LRA bases or nuclear weapons storage sites, including:
 - a. Arrival and/or erection at LRA bases of prefabricated buildings having temperature and humidity control facilities;
 - b. Rapid accumulation of large amounts of packing materials;
 - c. Intensive storage-battery preparation activity;
 - d. Unusual number of personnel surrounding or working on aircraft.

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29. Major deployment of long-range bomber and tanker aircraft to Arctic or other forward airfields;
30. Flights of limited numbers of transports simultaneously to several potential staging bases, especially if all aircraft are subordinate to a single military command, e.g., Long Range Aviation;
31. Deployment of additional tactical bomber aircraft to northeast Siberia, the southern Maritime region, the European Satellites, the Baltic, Caucasus and Turkmen areas;
32. Increased transportation activity (concurrent with a standdown of major elements of the Soviet Air Force), especially to or from LRA home bases, potential staging bases, and/or nuclear weapons storage sites;
33. Abnormally high degree of activity and preparations for combat deployment (including assembly of aircraft) of airborne units in the western USSR and/or Far East; or the redeployment of airborne troops and lift to northeast Siberia, the southern Maritime region, the European Satellites, the Baltic, Black Sea or Caucasus areas;
34. Selective withdrawal of naval units from the Black or Baltic Seas;
35. Assembly of ground force units and amphibious lift in the southern Maritime, Sakhalin-Kuriles, Black Sea, Baltic and White Sea-Kola Peninsula coastal areas;
36. Deployment of naval unit auxiliaries to support amphibious operations;
37. Forward movement (along axis of possible ground operations) and/or emplacement of heavy or complex mobile military equipment (heavy artillery, tank recovery vehicles, tactical missile launchers, field AAA, etc.);
38. Establishment of field command posts for Soviet ground force units in proximity to Western borders, particularly in East Germany and the Transcaucasus;

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39. Movement into forward areas of chemical and radiological decontamination teams;
40. Widespread appearance of troop units and individual military personnel (including especially service, technical or other non-combat personnel in "battle-dress," with field equipment and personal weapons;
41. Departure from normal garrison areas in the western USSR of ground force units, forward movement of such units to trans-shipment points into Eastern Europe, or movement into Eastern Europe of additional Soviet ground force units;
42. Rapid forward deployment (almost certainly at night) of major Soviet ground force striking units, particularly in East Germany and the Transcaucasus.

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E. Logistic Preparations:

43. Release or shipment of nuclear weapons and/or components to combat units (particularly to Long Range Aviation, submarine forces, tactical aviation, SAM and SSM units); especially simultaneous, highly secure, urgent priority shipments (particularly by air) to LRA bases and/or missile launching sites from known nuclear weapons installations;
44. Release or shipment of other controlled mass weapons, such as CW and BW, to combat units;
45. Additional buildup of "ready" stocks of combat supplies, fuel and ammunition at permanent operational or combat sites (AAA, SAM and SSM sites, tactical and staging airfields, etc.);
46. Logistic readjustments, particularly in Eastern Europe, to facilitate supply and resupply of forward ground units, e.g.: establishment of new dumps in forward areas or near transport centers and transport airfields; changes to local distribution; issuance of excess supplies (at combat levels) to be carried with units; forward movement of supplies, especially POL and ammunition, to dispersed locations in proximity to lines of departure for ground force operations;
47. Expansion of military medical services, including assembly of hospital trains, enlargements to and increased numbers of field medical installations in forward areas;
48. Establishment or designation of field decontamination, first-aid, bathing stations, etc.;
49. Issuance of large quantities of expendable medical supplies, with emphasis on anti-burn and short-life supplies (blood, antibiotics, etc.), to field medical units;
50. Issuance of individual emergency and first-aid kits (including dosimeters) and protective clothing to troops;
51. Forward movement or emplacement of river-crossing and bridge repair equipment in forward areas;
52. Large-scale removal from temporary storage of military equipment, removal of preservatives, and overhauling of equipment.

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F. Transportation:


53. Assumption of control by the military, or military coordination of, civil transport services — rail, air and sea;
54. Assignment of aircraft of the Civil Air Fleet to the Soviet military air forces or the Airborne Forces, and their utilization in direct support of military movements or logistic operations;
55. Sudden dispersal of shipping from ports and harbors, railroad rolling stock from marshalling yards or other concentrations, aircraft from major air bases or terminals, and vehicles from metropolitan areas;
56. Widespread dislocation of normal transport schedules or re-adjustments of schedules to ensure maximum support and re-supply for military forces; cancellation of transport normally available for non-military traffic;
57. Unusually heavy volume of military orders for rolling stock, or the marshalling of empty rolling stock (particularly troop cars, heavy flat cars, POL tank cars, and equipment from railroad military reserve pools), especially in the western military districts of the USSR and in Eastern Europe;
58. Abnormally heavy military activity and imposition of unusual security restrictions at key rail junctions in the western USSR and Eastern Europe, particularly the major transshipment points from the USSR to Eastern Europe;
59. Cancellation of leaves of railroad personnel.

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EXTERNAL

H. Intelligence and Reconnaissance:

64. Flights of Soviet - Communist or unidentified bomber-type aircraft toward the US or other possible target areas;
65. Initiation of aerial, or constant ground or water, reconnaissance of major US (and UK) military bases and units (particularly SAC bases, naval carrier units, and missile sites);
66. Initiation of weather reconnaissance over northern North America, Western Europe, North Africa, Japan-Okinawa and the aerial approaches thereto (especially in probable aerial refueling areas);
67. Sharp increase in espionage and other intelligence activity directed against US and Western leadership and policy organs and US and allied military targets world-wide (with emphasis on SAC, forward units in Western Europe, missile installations, air defense, carrier and submarine units); possible corresponding decrease in such activity directed against economic and low-level political targets.

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(Short)

I. Clandestine:

- 68. Widespread sabotage, or other interference, at key Western military, transport and communications installations (particularly air defense, SAC, tactical air, naval carrier units, SSM sites or guidance installations);**
- 69. Preparations for, or evidence of assassination, or other incapacitation, of key (particularly US and UK) military and governmental leaders and vital military personnel (e.g., SAC and submarine crews, SSM guidance and launching teams); The introduction or attempted introduction of nuclear weapons or components into the US by clandestine methods;**
- 70. Positioning of automatic guidance devices, through air drops or clandestine activity, in aerial approach routes or target areas (major military installations or metropolitan, communication or industrial centers);**

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(Short)

J. Diplomatic and Propaganda:

72. Widespread efforts to create confusion in the West, particularly among the leadership, and to paralyze or diffuse governmental or military command reactions to rapidly changing situations, through the issuance of urgent ultimata or threats to NATO or other Western allies or through presentation of urgent appeals for peaceful adjustments, possibly involving radical Soviet concessions;
73. Extensive efforts at high governmental or political levels to separate nations from NATO or other Western alliances and to ensure the neutrality of uncommitted nations;
74. Efforts to achieve at least a semblance of accommodation with the West, or other improvements in relationships, in major peripheral problems;
75. Dissemination of propaganda or rumors (not necessarily identifiable as Soviet or Communist inspired) tending to reduce popular confidence, or the confidence of subordinate officials, in Western military and governmental leadership and effectiveness (particularly in the US and the UK).

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(Short)

K. Naval Operations and Shipping:

76. Large-scale deployment of submarines to North American coastal waters, the major trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific shipping lanes, Japanese waters, North Sea-Bay of Biscay-Mediterranean area, Indian Ocean;
77. Deployment of numerous individual major naval surface units world-wide (possibly overtly, but intended as missile launchers or surface raiders);
78. Withdrawal of a major portion of the cargo and tanker fleet from international or non-Communist waters (particular reference to large modern vessels, or those most suitable for military support operations);
79. Simultaneous deployment of merchant vessels to major North American ports, North American coastal waters, the Panama Canal (overtly, but possibly intended as missile launchers, for the clandestine employment of nuclear weapons, or for intelligence purposes);
80. Deployments of fishing fleets (or their retention out-of-season) in strategic waters or near potential landing areas (Icelandic, North Sea, Scandinavian, Turkish Black Sea, Japanese or Alaskan coastal waters) - (overt, but possibly for direct support of military operations, collection of intelligence, or to cover undersea operations or movements);
81. Sudden deviation from declaration of destination of a large number of Soviet/Satellite merchant ships, or other changes in the pattern of scheduled operations.

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(Medium)

II. MEDIUM RANGE

Introduction:

Actions or developments which might accompany or follow a decision to ready the nation or the military forces generally for any eventuality, or which might follow a deliberate decision for war but precede formulation, issuance or implementation of specific operational plans and orders.

Such actions, or some combination of them, might arise under the following circumstances (not necessarily complementary):

A deliberate Soviet decision to launch a major assault at some future early date, precise or imprecise, and to bring the nation and its forces to a general state of readiness which would permit necessary specific pre-assault deployments with a minimum of delay, confusion and dislocation;

A Soviet decision that the international situation, or the general trend of US or Western actions, justified bringing the nation and its forces to a general state of readiness which might not be considered economically feasible over a long period during normal conditions;

In the first instance (deliberate hostilities), the minimum by which such actions might precede an attack might vary from several weeks to as much as six months. Deliberate hostilities might entail an apparent minimum of urgency but a maximum of secrecy, while a decision taken in response to the international situation might be reflected by maximum urgency and minimum secrecy.

Actions in this category, while economically expensive, would probably not result in the eventual long-run decline in military efficiency believed characteristic of many of those in the Short Range category.

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(Medium)

INTERNAL

A. Security Restrictions:

1. Progressive initiation of new, and possibly individually minor, security measures, resulting in a progressive reduction of military and logistic information available to the West:
 - a. Internal travel restrictions,
 - b. Increasing isolation of foreign communities in the USSR, including foreign Communists,
 - c. Communications security measures,
 - d. Increasing vagueness of open discussions and references (press and radio) to industrial and military activities and personalities;
2. Imposition of increasingly stringent flight restrictions within the USSR (and the Bloc), including more stringent identification and other procedures controlling movements into Communist airspace from outside; similarly increasing stringency in procedures controlling the movements of Western shipping calling at Communist (particularly Soviet) ports;
3. Cancellations of, or failure to renew, charters of Western vessels carrying cargoes to or from Soviet or Communist ports; insistence on the use of Communist (or Soviet) vessels only for the movement of cargo to or from Communist ports;
4. Evacuation from border areas, or likely areas of military build-up, of civilians and/or military dependents.

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(Medium)

B. Civil Defense:

5. Progressive evacuation or relocation of vital industrial plants or of segments of the populace from the major metropolitan centers or concentrations;
6. Initiation of widespread determined program of preparations for passive air defense:
 - a. Widespread renewal and maintenance of existing shelters;
 - b. Preparations of dispersed shelters for emergency and disaster repair crews and equipment;
 - c. Construction of new personnel shelters, and of shelters or revetments for industrial and transport equipment;
 - d. Widespread popular and practical instruction and organization for procedures to be followed in event of an attack.

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(Medium)

C. Industrial Production:

7. Widespread, or limited, conversion of industry to military production, particularly in areas not subject to foreign observation;
8. Abandonment, limited or complete, of construction on long-range economic or on essentially consumer projects (housing, etc.);
9. Large-scale production or procurement of short-life or unstable military or medical supplies (e.g., BW agents, liquid rocket fuels, liquid oxygen, blood);
10. Conversion of civil transport (vessels, aircraft, rolling stock, trucks) for military use - to enable their diversion to the military forces with minimum notice (as troop carriers, tenders, hospital trains, etc.); limited integration of such converted transport into military transport or support units.

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(Medium)

D. Military Planning, Organization and Training:

11. Initiation of high-priority planning conferences and/or information exchanges, both inter-and intra-service and between Soviet and Satellite commands;
12. Initiation of high-priority inspection and assessment surveys of units and facilities of the major striking and defensive forces.
13. Increased or out-of-schedule recruit callups, or retention in service of military classes scheduled for demobilization;
14. Mobilization of reserve or new units, especially technical or specialist services (medical, chemical, decontamination, signal, engineer, etc.);
15. Rapid increase in the activation and training of surface-to-surface guided missile units;
16. Cessation or interruption of leave programs, or of scheduled discharge or rotation programs;
17. Assignment of experienced, rather than inexperienced, replacements or fillers from interior or second-line units to combat or elite units (ground, sea or air), particularly in the forward areas (e.g., Germany);
18. Major command readjustments:
 - a. Creation of new operational headquarters to centralize control or coordination of world-wide submarine, Long Range Aviation or missile operations;
 - b. Creation of new task force headquarters in the regional commands (e.g., Soviet forces in Germany, or in the Far East);
19. Sudden or increasing evidence of close relationships between nuclear energy and LRA installations, and/or between nuclear energy and guided missile installations, as evidenced by:
 - a. Movement or exchanges of personnel among nuclear energy, LRA, or guided missile installations;

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(Medium)

- b. Movement of long-range bombers;
 - c. Movement of civil or military transport aircraft;
 - d. Greater exchange of information between such installations.
- 20. Establishing of an operational headquarters for the Warsaw Pact Organization; provision with adequate communications;
- 21. Increased emphasis on preparations of military personnel to defend themselves against the effects of nuclear and/or unconventional weapons, evidenced by:
 - a. Rapid and urgent training;
 - b. Issuance or use of special equipment for protection or decontamination.

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(Medium)

E. Military Movements and Operations:

22. Withdrawals of large numbers of naval combat units (surface and submarine) from the Black Sea and, to a lesser extent, the Baltic Sea;
23. Unusually large-scale or realistic training maneuvers, particularly apparent rehearsals by Long Range Aviation units or submarines for offensive operations --

(especially those involving: intensified flight activity by newly activated LRA bomber units, training of LRA bomber crews in heavy-weight take-offs, out of season operations, unusually extensive geographical deployment and close timing, or the widespread operational employment of new equipment, tactics or command structures without prior small-scale operational testing by selected units);
24. Movement of additional Soviet combat, specialist and technical units to the European Satellites, particularly combat units to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia;
25. Movement of additional service, technical and signal units to Arctic air or staging bases;
26. Deployment of short-range missile units, launching and fuel generating equipment to the European Satellites;
27. Cessation of normal local training operations by long-range submarines (to permit briefing, maintenance, supplying for extensive patrols, etc.).

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(Medium)

F. Logistic Preparations:

28. Conversion of combat aircraft for specialized functions (CW or BW dissemination, improved nuclear delivery capability — including white underpainting of long-range bombers);
29. Conversion of operational heavy or medium bombers as tankers;
30. Withdrawal of large numbers of combat aircraft, tanks, artillery, etc., from storage;
31. Improvement of bridges and roads in forward areas (e.g., East Germany);
32. Stacking of expendable military supplies (especially fuel, ammunition, and spare parts), sufficient for protracted operations during interruptions of normal transport, in the forward areas (Germany and other Satellites, the southern Maritime region, Kamchatka-Chukotsk, Central and Western Arctic, Transcaucasus);
33. Reactivation of unused and "phantom" airfields in the European Satellites; installation of communications, maintenance and other facilities;
34. Buildup of servicing, technical and communications (including navigation/guidance) facilities and of stocks (fuel, ammunition, ports, etc.) at Arctic air or staging bases sufficient to support protracted or large-scale operations by Long Range Aviation or interceptor units;
35. Crash program for construction of long-range missile launching sites and of facilities for initial guidance;
36. Deployment and emplacement of intermediate-range missiles, launching and fuel generating equipment in Western USSR, the Maritime region and northeast Siberia;
37. Movement of missiles or missile-carrying vehicles from production sites, and fuel in operational quantities, to rail or water shipping points or to potential launching sites;

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(Medium)

38. Full-scale production of liquid oxygen plants and subsequent heavy transport activity, particularly by chemical-type insulated tank cars or trucks, to surface-to-surface missile sites.
39. Construction and installation of a communications system sufficient to provide centralized control and coordination for missile operations;
40. Extensive (around-the-clock) maintenance, servicing and repair activities at submarine bases in the White Sea and Pacific areas.

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(Medium)

EXTERNAL

G. Intelligence and Reconnaissance:

41. Extensive collection, assemblage and revision of intelligence on US and Western striking forces, defenses, and principal military and economic targets (to assist in final planning and target selection for deliberate hostilities, or to confirm or deny estimated trends in US or Western actions) -- probably without using standby or emergency collection nets;
42. Expansion and revision of usual weather services to Soviet forces (especially to Long Range Aviation, air defense, submarine and missile organizations), to include increased numbers of daily broadcasts and more frequent broadcasts of upper wind data, long-range forecasts and weather data on the US and other possible target areas.

H. Clandestine:

43. Extensive efforts (not necessarily identified as Communist-inspired) to further civil unrest, strikes or dissension in US base areas or strategic transport centers abroad (Western Europe, North Africa, Middle East, Okinawa-Japan), such as would interfere with, or delay the construction of, military installations, the deployment of strategic US forces or cadres, or the receipt or stocking of vital military supplies by US or allied forces.

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(Medium)

I. Diplomatic and Propaganda:

- 44. Political and diplomatic efforts to achieve an apparent substantial reduction in East-West tension -- particularly US-USSR, -- which might achieve a relaxation in US national military efforts, readiness and alertness.

J. Military:

- 45. Large-scale movement of naval vessels, particularly submarines, and military support vessels to the Far East and to the Kola Peninsula-White Sea area;
- 46. Movement of Soviet air units, air support personnel or units, or submarine units and supporting base units to forward areas, including Albania, North Korea and/or Communist China;
- 47. Clandestine deployment of small Soviet combat (ground, sea or air) or technical support units to non-Communist strategic areas - (as might be accomplished through military aid programs involving the sending of modern military equipment and large military training or technical missions).

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(Long)

III. LONG RANGE

Introduction:

Actions or developments which might be involved in the intensified achievement of specific military capabilities, offensive or defensive, essential to the prosecution of general hostilities which are either generally anticipated or deliberately planned.

Such actions, or some combination or variation of them, might arise under one or more of the following circumstances:

Deliberate decision to initiate hostilities on or about some pre-determined future date;

Adoption of a specific broad strategic plan for the conduct of such hostilities;

Decision to bring the nation to a high peak of military readiness on or about some pre-determined date - either in anticipation of the increasing likelihood of hostilities at such a period or to permit a deliberate decision for hostilities at such a date;

Acceptance of a risk of shorter long-range economic deterioration or of some long-range temporary deterioration in military readiness or capability;

Soviet estimate that certain US military preparations or trends would lead to overwhelming US superiority - or to a temporary US inferiority;

Soviet estimate that certain discoveries available to the USSR, if exploited, could lead to overwhelming Soviet superiority, even if temporary.

In the first instance (deliberate hostilities), such actions would precede the launching of an attack by a considerable period, varying from several months to several years. Actions ensuing from a deliberate decision for hostilities might be characterized by a maximum of secrecy and a minimum of urgency. Those ensuing from a decision for maximum exploitation of a new discovery would probably be carried out with a maximum of urgency and secrecy.

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(Long)

INTERNAL

A. Civil Defense:

1. Firm adoption of a specific civil defense doctrine and procedures;
2. Subsequent determined and extensive construction of adequate necessary facilities (whether in the form of deep, metropolitan shelters, or in the form of outlying dispersal shelters, etc.) - at the expense of normal non-military construction;
3. Extensive program for dispersal and underground location of vital industrial plants, governmental and military headquarters, stock-piles, etc. (even with considerable loss to production, efficiency of distribution, etc.).

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(Long)

B. Industrial Production:

4. Large-scale expansion in production in industries or plants presently producing military equipment;
5. Freezing or standardizing of design or production specifications of military equipment used in quantity by offensive striking forces (especially types presently subject to rapid technological improvements - missiles, aircraft, weapons and warheads, electronic devices);
6. Highly selective intensification of research, development, and proto-type and operational testing of such equipment;
7. Establishment of any new large-scale research-developmental-production program under conditions of highest priority, urgency and secrecy - such as might follow a decision for earliest maximum exploitation of a new military-scientific discovery;
8. Diversion of large portion of scientific talent from basic research to development tasks and production engineering;
9. Initiation of selective crash military production programs -- at the expense of other military production, including that of defensive weapons:
 - a. Tanker aircraft (possibly at the expense of heavy or medium bomber production),
 - b. ICBM's,
 - c. Long range submarines,
 - d. Heavy bombers,
10. Widespread and urgent conversion of long-range submarines and/or surface vessels (combat or non-combat) as missile launching platforms (possibly at the expense of new surface or submarine construction);
11. Extensive "crash" construction/improvement program at airfields, involving readying or extension of runways to handle heavy bombers, the construction of more extensive POL storage facilities at potential staging bases than the normal needs of the area would warrant, and the preparation of nuclear weapon handling facilities.

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(Long)

C. Military Operations and Training:

12. Exclusive emphasis in doctrine and training on offensive operations and on specific offensive operations (against specific US targets and forces);
13. Expansion of training programs for new submarine and bomber crews, missile launching units, and associated servicing, maintenance and technical units -- well beyond the level required by the present military establishment and apparent equipment delivery rates, without regard for weather or holidays, and possibly at the expense of training and personnel needs of other arms and services;
14. Widespread and urgent conversion training of experienced crews or units of other arms (e.g., light bomber, surface naval, artillery and AAA units) for heavy bomber, submarine or missile operations.

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(Long)

EXTERNAL

D. Diplomatic and Propaganda:

15. Extensive effort to achieve a reduction in international tensions, or in US and Western popular mistrust of the USSR, sufficient to effect a slowdown in the US base programs and in US military procurement and a reduction in US popular support for a heavy arms program, or any major element of it.

E. Clandestine:

16. Extensive efforts to further strikes or other interruptions or interferences with US or UK production in key industries vital to the production of advanced military equipment used in strategic bomber, missile or air defense systems (electronics, aviation, missiles, rocket fuels, etc.).

SECRET